Confucius Institutes as Instruments of Soft Power: Comparison with International Rivals

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Abstract: The Chinese Confucius Institutes, which have become common around the world and particularly in Asia, have followed the examples of the British Council, Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute. Yet by following the earlier examples, Confucius Institutes have the benefit of late development and can learn from the experiences of earlier approaches. This paper studies and analyses the overseas education institutions of China, Britain, France and Germany to identify similarities and dissimilarities and then draws conclusions from this. It is shown that Confucius Institutes are a representative of the overseas soft power approach of the Chinese government and have multiple intentions and purposes.

Keywords: Alliance Française, British Council, Confucius Institute, Goethe Institute, soft power

1. Introduction

The rise of China as a regional and global economic superpower has aroused a range of emotions in observers from around the world. To obtain resources and markets, the Chinese state has deployed its corporations to invest and build facilities and institutions in nearly every country of the world (e.g. Carmody & Owusu, 2007). It has shown no squeamishness about investing in non-democratic or even repressive regimes and this has won it friends in government circles in those areas (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008). Although its hard power capability is increasing, its military forces are in no way capable of reaching superpower status in the foreseeable future. However, its soft power efforts are bearing fruit, especially in those countries in which long and close relations with China (perhaps indicated by the presence of a significant ethnic minority Chinese population). Military capability has been focused significantly on the possibility of conflict in the Straits of Taiwan (Storey, 2011:93-4) and also to exert its putative sovereignty in island chains in the South China Sea in the face of opposition by the Philippines, Vietnam and others (Brennan, 2012). Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army is adjudged to be limited, at best (Lai, 2012). In Southeast Asia, perhaps in part to try to alleviate disquiet over possible maritime expansionism, China has been mounting a form of charm offensive by accompanying its commercial investments with the building of facilities and provision of goods. The National Cultural Hall in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, is one of several high-profile public buildings to grace cities in the Mekong Region, while road widening and high-speed railway projects also offer the prospect of bringing closer the places of production and consumption in China and mainland Southeast Asia (McCartan, 2011). This takes place in conjunction with the construction of the Asian Highway Network by the Asian Development Bank and the opening of the North-South and East-West Economic Corridors which will enable the much more rapid movement of goods throughout the region and its neighbors (Madhur, Wignaraja & Darjes, 2009).

In addition, the Chinese government has authorized the creation and dissemination of Confucius Institutes (CIs), which are bilateral university-university (or other institution in the receiving country) partnerships that provide Chinese language facilities in overseas countries. Given the rise of China’s economy, interest in learning Chinese has blossomed internationally, although not without some problems (Gil, 2008). Following the examples of the British Council Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute, the CI concept represents a means of promoting Chinese soft power in important overseas partners. Just as in the case of their European forebears, CIs can be expected to develop a range of additional programs designed to develop interest in studying Chinese society and language and creating stronger personal and institutional relationships. While this approach seems benign, some have questioned whether it hides something more sinister, akin to a ‘Trojan Horse’ approach (Paradise, 2009). Other observers find that the CI network resembles contemporary multinational businesses in terms of information-sharing and rapid capacity development (Li, Mirimirani & Ilacqua, 2009). There is also the consideration of whether CIs will be instrumental in helping Chinese replace English as the world’s principal language (Zhao & Huang, 2010). If that were to happen, there would be incalculable diplomatic benefits to China in addition to a radical restructuring of the multi-billion international English language
teaching industry and the organization of the internet and of information provision and storage. Mandarin Chinese is already thought to be the world’s second most important business language (Lauerman, 2011).

Although the rise of Chinese language may not lead to its apex position in the foreseeable future, it can still have a significant impact in a specific country, especially one in which there is an asymmetrical architecture of power and, where China is concerned, nearly every relationship is very much an asymmetrical relationship because of the great size and power of that country. This paper investigates the case of Thailand and the effect of CIs and Chinese soft power. The purpose is to investigate the role of soft power, as currently expressed, in a specific context. The paper continues with an investigation of relevant literature, then an explanation of the methodological approach employed and then the findings obtained and their discussion. To bring the rise and role of CIs into context, comparison is made with the soft power provision of three comparable language institutions, from the UK, Germany and France. It is shown that there are some significant and important distinctions between these different institutions and the implications of this are considered.

2. Literature Review

In common with other international language teaching institutions, the CIs are an example of the expression of soft power. Soft power is synonymous with non-military power and includes both cultural power and economic strength (Glaser & Murphy, 2009). In short, soft power is the “power to attract, to inform, to influence and thus, to transform, the ability to persuade through culture, value, and ideas as opposed to ‘hard power,’ which conquers through military might (ibid).” Nye (2004) states that cultural events, exchange programs, broadcasting or teaching a country’s language and promoting the study of a country’s culture and society are often seen as tools of soft power. Soft power contrasts with hard power and is the ability to affect the behavior of others by influencing their preferences. This implies that hard power is the ability to affect the behavior of others by changing their circumstances. The soft power concept has gained importance as newer paradigms in international relations have replaced the concept of realism. The realist paradigm of international relations was created during the Cold War period and bears some hallmarks of its formative years. Realism takes as its basis the position that people compete with each other for scarce resources and will be willing to use force (i.e. hard power) to obtain their goals (e.g. Morgenthau, 1958; Niebuhr, 1977). This was developed by Waltz (1967), in the form of neo-realism, by focusing on the systemic elements involved and, specifically, on how countries rather than individuals contend with each other. Realism models have in common the understanding that states act as the principal agents, while the result of their interactions is a zero-sum game in which the amount by which one state wins (i.e. through obtaining access to resources) is exactly the same extent by which its rivals lose (cf. Axelrod, 1984). It is possible to consider the efforts expended by Chinese corporations to secure exclusive access to raw minerals in Africa to be an example of realistic ideology in action (Turner, 2007).

Realist thinkers have also been challenged by the proponents of international law, who have provided various arguments to demonstrate how international actors are and should be constrained by the laws agreed to by most if not all nations at multinational organizations such as the United Nations (Burley, 1993). If international laws do not prevail, then the world will be in a form of anarchy, which is a dangerous situation to have to endure. The invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies may be seen as a demonstration of the conflict between realists and liberals in action.

Realism retains its proponents but has largely been superseded by liberal paradigms, which add two central insights to the previous paradigm. The first is that it is not just states that act in international relations but non-state actors can also be important. Non-state actors can be individuals, organizations or institutions which have an impact on the society of other countries without using hard power. Such acts can be peaceful in nature and result from domestic structures and policies (Katzenstein, 1976). The second addition of the liberal paradigm is that it is possible for interactions to result in a win-win or positive sum game. That is, states or non-state actors can deal with each other in ways that benefit both of them – this is, after all, the basis of international trade predicated on the work of David Ricardo (López, 2005). This form of thinking is often conducted through a game-theoretic perspective, in which it is possible to simulate the relative gains and losses experienced by different states as a result of various decisions that might be made (Snidal, 1991). This is a system that can be threatened if irrational actors are involved (e.g. North Korea can be considered an irrational insofar as it sometimes behaves in ways that will not bring about the best result for itself) or if non-state actors can ignore the constrains of international law (e.g. terrorists or international criminal gangs) (Picarelli, 2006).
The interplay of the two paradigms of realism and liberalism have given rise to a variety of resultant or parallel models, with institutional and structural models being perhaps the most theoretically interesting and coherent (e.g. Wendt, 1987). What has become evident is that soft power has become recognized as an important means by which states can try to influence people in other societies to have opinions which suit them and that language teaching is an important part of that soft power (Nye, 2004). Soft power works effectively when people in other countries have an incentive to study and admire the cultural traditions and products of the power-wielding society. It is certainly true that many people around the world do admire Chinese culture and society and wish to learn more about it. For them, Chinese language teaching institutes are a logical next step (Gill & Huang, 2006). One of the purposes of the use of soft power is to try to create a form of hegemony in the cultural sphere. That is, the concept derived from the work of Antonio Gramsci that it is possible to use the power of cultural products to influence or even control people in remote locations (Germain & Kenny, 1998). If this is the case, then it would clearly offer measurable and quantifiable benefits for the soft power-wielding state. There is a large-scale debate on soft power among the Chinese and the term “soft power” has been formally adopted by top PRC (People’s Republic of China) leaders such as President Hu Jintao (Vuving, 2009). On a global scale, the renaissance of soft power has begun, re-assessing, re-defining and even re-inventing tools and targets of traditional cultural diplomacy. Among these tools is the language teaching institute, which includes the Chinese Confucius Institutes, the British Council, the Goethe Institute of Germany and the Alliance Française. The purpose of this paper is to compare the teaching institutions operated by the four countries involved with a view to trying to identify significant differences between them and draw some conclusions from those differences.

3. Methodology

The research reported on in this paper combines an analytical case study approach using mostly secondary data with some personal interviewing conducted on a convenience sampling basis. Respondents were drawn from the ranks of administrators, instructors and students of four CIs located within Thai universities, which were Chulalongkorn University, Kasetsart University, Mahasarakam University and SuanDusitRajabhat University. Interviews were conducted in a mixture of Thai and English and extensive note-taking led to subsequent transcription for content analysis according to a recognized approach. This paper contains research findings from a larger research project at doctoral level. There are limitations to this research in terms of time and space, specifically with respect to the range of respondents consulted and the geographical coverage. It is intended that some of the gaps in coverage will be filled by subsequent, on-going research.

4. Language Institutes

The Alliance Française: The Alliance Française (French Alliance) is an international organization that aims to promote French language and culture around the world. It was created in Paris on 21 July, 1883, by a country which had been psychologically as well as physically destroyed by the recent Franco-Prussian War (Nye, 2008). Outside of Paris, the branches of the Alliance are run as independent franchises by local organizations. Each branch is governed by a President working through a designated committee. As a brand, however, Alliance Française is owned and controlled by the central organization in Paris, the Alliance Française Foundation. It has become a leading global cultural network with a total of 1,040 establishments in as many as 136 countries, spread across all five continents of the world. Around the world, some 450,000 people attend one of the branches to learn French and, when all the people who participate in one or more of the cultural events mounted, the number rises to more than six million. These are purely cultural events, according to the Foundation, which have no political or religious components. However, this rather contradicts the concept of soft power as a whole, which argues that a language teaching institution by its very nature is a representative of a state’s ability to affect the people of another state and to impose, even mildly, a form of cultural hegemony. By providing a second, possibly contradictory or challenging cultural prerogative, Alliance Française may necessitate the fostering of cosmopolitan citizenship in those who receive the education (Starkey, 2007). In any case, the branches tend to fund their activities from the fees they receive for language tuition and from the rental of installations. The French government also provides some funds, representing a subsidy of about 5% of its total budget. The network also receives support for innovative representations of French culture and a multicultural approach, such as mounting tours of French-speaking rap artists (Huq, 2001).
The Goethe Institute: The German non-profit organization Goethe Institute was established in 1951 and acts as a means of promoting the language and culture of Germany outside of the German-speaking countries. At first, it was established as a means of providing tuition for foreign German teachers in Germany but it has subsequently expanded to become a worldwide institution (Welle, 2011). Further, the Goethe Institute also provides information on German society and politics while promoting inter-cultural relations with people of other nations by such means as the exchange of films, music, theatre and literature. The Goethe Institute did not open internationally until well after the end of WWII, with an office launched in Athens in 1952. There are currently 149 Goethe Institutes around the world in 93 countries, with 13 located in Germany itself (Germany.info, 2012). In the post-war period, cultural diplomacy began to be taken very seriously as a means of rehabilitating Germany into the family of international nations. It was considered that it could accomplish many important tasks and that these would justify whatever level of resources and funding was called for: these included the promotion of dialogue, understanding and building mutual trust between people at the international level and thereby contributing to the potential success of peaceful relations internationally. Later, it was supposed to serve as an ‘early warning system’ for conflicts abroad (Hans Magnus Enzensberger), serving a cross-cultural engine in a global ‘learning community’ (Wolf Lepenies) and as a means to build civil societies in formerly authoritarian regimes and to introduce and disseminate a Western style “culture of liberty” (Joschka Fischer) worldwide (Sölter 2008). This approach is based on the assumption that, in an age of international soft power that has moved beyond the realist approach to international relations, instead incorporating the role of non-state actors in a system which offers the possibility of positive sum games. This is an approach that will, of course, be preferable to the use of hard power and ultimately will be more successful in doing so. However, the rise of the internet and the spread and deepening of globalization have to some extent undermined the role of language institutions such as the Goethe Institute because there are now so many more sources of information which individuals can access in any combination or quantity that suits them. This has undermined the various attempts to promote the spread of the German language which has taken place in different guises over the past century (Ammon, 2009).

The British Council: The British Council represents the UK in the world and acts as a means of furthering cultural relations and education links with the people of other countries. It has established operations in 110 countries and territories around the world with the stated aim of creating opportunities for interaction that will increase the level of trust between the people of Britain and the people of other countries in the world. The British Council was founded by King George VI in 1934 during the period of the British Empire and was intended to be a means of promoting the understanding of Britain, its culture and interests around the world, particularly in connection with its colonial interests and holdings. The network of offices developed rapidly and intensively as a result of the Second World War since assistance from all other societies was treasured and it was far from clear that colonized countries would be willing to fight on behalf of the allied side: when Japanese forces invaded Burma, for example, different factions of Burmese fought on both sides (Thompson, 2010). After the conclusion of the war, the period of decolonization began and, together with the ruinous cost of fighting the war, the large network of British Council offices was significantly reduced. However, economic recovery in Britain and the emergence of new economic powers in, for example, East Asia, together with the impact of the Cold War, led to the re-emergence of the British Council worldwide as a means of promoting commercial as well as cultural and political aims (Donaldson, 1984). The Council claims to be a non-political organization operating at arm’s-length from the government but this is not accepted by everyone, as the fact that it has had a lot of trouble recently in Russia, with accusations that some of its staff have been involved in spying, would tend to indicate (e.g. Harding, 2008). There are now 218 British Council Teaching Centers in 110 countries and the organization claims to be the world’s largest English language teaching organization. It is certainly the case that the study of the English language has become one of the world’s most rapidly growing and important service sectors and control of it and its benefits is of considerable importance. As part of this effort, new forms of control have been invented in terms of proficiency tests for students to be accepted on an international basis, such as the International English Language Testing Systems (IELTS), which was first pioneered in 1965 (British Council, 2012). A great deal of effort has been expended upon ensuring that British Council offices are present in and working well in strategically important overseas countries and markets – for example in the Gulf oil exporting countries and in Chinese societies. This has not always involved explicitly commercial activities but through the careful spreading of good information management and library services (Coombs, 1988).

The Confucius Institutes: The Confucius Institute (CI) is a project initiated by the office of Chinese language council international (Hanban). Its main purpose is to promote global knowledge of the Chinese
language and culture and to deepen friendships between China and the rest of the world. The number of CIs worldwide has grown very quickly, attracting significant attention both in China and overseas (Hartig, 2010). The first CI opened in 2004 in Seoul, South Korea and since then more than 100 have been opened in dozens of countries around the world. The highest concentrations of CIs are in the United States, Japan and South Korea, which are countries of critical importance to the Chinese economy. As of October 2010, there were 303 CIs and 369 Confucius Classrooms in 93 countries and regions. The Ministry of Education of China estimates that there will be interactions with as many as 100 million people in a total of 1,000 overseas CIs by 2020. China promotes Chinese language and cultural programs in the form of CI partnerships between universities in China and the host countries. In addition, the Hanban program stipulates that CIs help to promote international business relationships with the host countries involved. After the first CI opened in Seoul, South Korean students had displaced the Japanese as the largest group of foreign students in China. The Institutes have become an important part of China's outward looking economic development program that was heralded by the Open Door policy announced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and subsequently enacted. The need for soft power has been exacerbated by international concerns (fairly or unfairly expressed) over China's acquisition of important minerals and resources, exchange rate policy and role in offshoring of manufacturing operations from developed nations. Thailand is a particularly important society in this respect, owing to the centuries' long relationship between the two countries, the presence of many millions of ethnic Chinese people in Thailand and the burgeoning commercial links between the two. In Thailand, within two years (2006–2008), CIs have opened at 12 universities in partnership with Chinese universities.

According to Starr (2009), the international promotion of Chinese culture is one of the more benign manifestations of this nationalism. Its theoretical justification is widely argued in articles on 'soft power' for both the Chinese domestic and international markets. The soft power concept has been heavily promoted in China in the last few years following its articulation in a series of books and articles by Joseph Nye Jr. from the early 1990s onwards. In the latest of these, soft power is defined as: 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments' (Nye, 2004). According to Lien Oh and Selmiér (2012), a CI acts as a non-profit educational organization satisfying the growing international demand to learn Chinese and enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture abroad. These act in the form of partnerships, with the Hanban providing the coordinating function. The Hanban is composed of representatives from 12 ministries and agencies of the central government and so is both powerful and well-connected. The Chinese university partners provide the teaching instructors and the teaching materials, while the partner universities in host countries provide the facilities and accommodation. However, CIs have not been welcomed in all places, since there remains some suspicion about the motives and intentions of the Chinese state and the power that it is able to wield. For example, in Japan the 17 Imperial universities have all refused to accept CIs and all the CIs in that country have been opened in private colleges. A similar situation may be found in the USA, where only a few leading universities have felt comfortable with accepting a CI as part of their institution, even though more than 60 have been opened there.

The soft power concept is a useful tool for understanding the role and profusion of CIs. Chinese authorities believe that if foreigners understand more about China and Chinese society then they will be more friendly and accommodating to China's interest (Starr, 2009). Meanwhile, many Chinese people feel a sense of nationalism about being Chinese and continue to be hurt by past outrages (e.g. the Opium Wars, the Rape of Nanking) and would welcome greater appreciation of China's contribution to world development and culture. CIs offer a means of meeting these objectives but also suffer from lack of logistics support. For example, Starr (2009) reports that the establishment of CIs in Germany was initially greatly successful and the number of Chinese majors more than doubled. However, there were problems with obtaining the necessary high-quality instructors from China and those that are available have not been able to adapt themselves to the western environment and so their teaching style is inappropriate. The result has been that the number of students has plummeted and the future of the programs has been cast into doubt. The benefits to Chinese society and economy as a whole, therefore, have been limited in comparison with the physical spread of the CIs to so many parts of the world (Gil, 2009).

Comparison of the Four Institutes: Table 1 below provides basic data for the four institutions. The rapid growth and spread of the CIs compared to the other teaching institutions is notable but it should also be considered that China is a very large country capable of devoting large amounts of resources into its efforts to internationalize – even so, reports from some CIs and their partnerships indicate that capacity constraints are being reached with inadequate numbers and quality of teachers leading to
declining interest and satisfaction. As a result, some CIs have closed their doors. The dates that each of the institutions were initiated are also instructive as to their purpose. Alliance Française was opened at the same time that imperial holdings in Indochina were being organized and represented part of the French so-called mission civilisatrice – the civilizing mission aimed at promoting understanding of French culture around the world. The British Council was not created until 1934, despite the lengthy history of the British Empire. Indeed, by the mid-1930s, in the wake of the Great Depression, the British Council can be seen as a final attempt to intensify resource extraction from an empire for which support was already slipping away and whose subjects were resisting ever more fiercely. The Goethe Institute was created in 1952 at a time when Germany was seeking to maintain and recreate its own identity at a time when it had been divided by the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of East Germany and, at the same time, to recreate friendly (or as friendly as possible) relations with other nations, mostly in Europe, which had been destroyed by wartime activities. It is notable that the first overseas Goethe Institute was opened in Athens, which had fought against German occupation and, when the global banking and austerity crisis struck, saw rapid escalation of bad feeling against the German government which was now being accused of financial hegemony over Greece.

Table 1: Comparison of the Four Institutions

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<th>Confucius Institutes</th>
<th>Alliance Française</th>
<th>British Council</th>
<th>Goethe Institute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established (duration)</td>
<td>2004 (9 years)</td>
<td>1883 (130 years)</td>
<td>1934 (79 years)</td>
<td>1952 (61 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>Exam</td>
<td>HSK</td>
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<td>IELTS</td>
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Source: compiled by authors from various sources

When the CIs began to open in 2004, meanwhile, it was evident that China was already fully engaged with the world as a means of securing resources and partners necessary to secure its rapid economic development and modernization. There is little doubt that the use of soft power was intended to complement the financial power that was being mobilized to establish the desired relationships. Nevertheless, it is evident that the four institutions represent an essentially similar attempt to spread soft power around the world. They take the form of solid, bricks-and-mortar establishments physically located in the desired overseas location and have become involved in a range of market-based transactions with its local customers. By creating and promoting officially sanctioned examination systems, they have sought to obtain exclusive access to customers and to create entry barriers to deter would-be local competitors. In some cases, as in the British Council, rivals have entered the market but that has been a market that has been growing substantially around the world and in which there is scope for alternative products. This seems to be less likely in the case of the CIs, since it would appear unlikely the Chinese government would accept official rivals and has the clout to make such intentions known in appropriate quarters.

**Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power:** The first thing to say about the CIs and the soft power of China is that they have been created much later than the other institutions from the UK, Germany and France. As late arrivals to the arena of soft power promotion, therefore, the Chinese authorities can learn from what has gone before and to seek to avoid mistakes made by the other institutions and take shortcuts to reaching the strong points they have achieved. This is not just a matter of time but one of technology. Previously, establishing institutions and their facilities overseas would be a significant undertaking requiring a great deal of resources and expertise. The presence of the internet and low cost mobile telecommunications, not to mention low cost international travel, now means that new institutions may be much more rapidly constructed and populated with linguistic and cultural resources. Experiences and best practice may be much more easily exchanged with other network partners and with the authorities in Beijing. This would probably be more of a factor if Chinese top-down, hierarchical bureaucracy in such situations as this did not present a bottleneck to production. Nevertheless, the reality and image of modernity that attach themselves to contemporary organizations has provided a benefit to the CIs which the other institutions have had to work hard to achieve and, in some cases, have still not really managed. The British Council, for example, tries hard to be contemporary in feeling and relevant in its operations but remains hampered by international impressions of Britain as a country that lives in the past and whose best days have long gone.
To capitalize on the newness of CIs and to sidestep problems that might have been associated with lack of organizational experience and competencies, the decision has been made to establish partnerships with established overseas partners, notably universities. This provides the CIs with immediate credibility drawn from the reputation and image of the partner university. Even if the partner is not drawn from the first rank of such institutions in the target country, it nevertheless is likely to provide more benefit than a CI that would be established independently. Further, if there is a need for further growth in the future, then the existing arrangement could of course be renegotiated. China as a country benefits from its extensive history and cultural productions and collecting and spreading soft power overseas also has the benefit that the country does not have a history of wars of aggression to acquire new territory. The annexation of Inner Mongolia and Tibet is justified by Chinese authorities on the basis that these lands have always been Chinese. The country is not expansionist in nature (Wang, 1999), although this perception might change as a result of conflict or tension in the islands of the South China Sea. It is also possible for events associated with space exploration also to change this perception. However, CIs do not have to make allowances for the events of history when reaching out to people from other countries, in general terms. Finally, the achievements of CIs should also be considered in the light of what the Chinese government actually wishes to achieve through deploying them. The exact number of people who undergo education there and the types of qualifications offered, although obviously important to those who attend, are likely to be thought of as slightly irrelevant to the Chinese government. Instead, they will wish their CIs to help position the understanding of the country and its people in a positive light in a future world in which global climate change and resource depletion is likely, if not certain, to bring about a return to some form of zero sum game international relations. Competition is likely to be enacted on a number of different fronts and the cultural and linguistic is certainly one of them.

5. Conclusion

Drawing on the experience of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain in promoting their national languages, China began the rapid expansion of Chinese learning and culture throughout the world by means of CIs. By implementing a university collaboration strategy, the growth of CIs has been extended to innumerable world universities, including many high schools that are held to be within the target market for this strategy. Owing to its long diplomatic relations with Thailand, it is noticeable that CIs in Thailand have been highly welcomed and developed on a very fast track under the patronage of H.R.H. Princess Maha Chakri Sirinthorn. The Thai government has been willing to accept the presence of CIs at even its most prestigious universities (notably Chulalongkorn University) and it will be interest to observe future developments in that country. There has been controversy and critique of China’s soft power concept, which operates in tandem with China’s economic growth, as a result, some countries have hesitated to cooperate with China and refused permission to start teaching Chinese in their public universities. Nevertheless, a further extension of CIs can be expected as long as Hanban still sustains the initial commitment, which is to promote Chinese language and culture overseas through collaborative action. Even so, it is important to keep an eye on the possibility of increasing both the quantity and the quality of Chinese instructors due to the growing shortage of qualified Chinese teachers. Consequently, it will be tremendous challenging for CIs to improve the management effectiveness in order to overcome this problem.

References


