South Africa's Military and Peacekeeping Efforts: A new paradigm shift in its foreign policy since 1994

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Abstract: One of the South Africa's great soft power attributes has been the attraction and power of its transition to inclusive democratic governance after a long period of apartheid rule. This gave South Africa a certain moral authority and prestige to play very significant roles in conflict resolution and mediation through peacekeeping operations. Every government in an ever-changing and dynamic geopolitical environment ensure that its defence force cum foreign policy conform to the international environment while aiming at the defence and protection of its national interests. Using interpretive approach; this work argues that; fundamentally, there are three basic factors that reinforce South Africa's participation in peacekeeping which are politics, economy and security. By extension these three elements is considered a transformational agent of South Africa's economy. SANDF is, therefore, considered a dynamic and exceptional foreign policy tool that complements and at same time enhances South Africa's diplomatic manoeuvrings and influence within the wider international developments. It is concluded that South Africa's multilateral and foreign policy agendas have been driven by the pursuit of its national interest while trying to ensure peace in other African states.

Keywords: *Peacekeeping, foreign policy, apartheid, development, diplomacy*

1. Introduction

Since its first inclusive; democratically, elected government in 1994, South Africa has shown preference for a normative drive in its foreign policy. In an ever-changing dynamic international environment, it is imperative for every government to make certain that its defence forces cum foreign policy is not only for the domestic environment but also work with the international community while aiming at the defence and protection of the domestic (socio-political and economic) environments. Debatably and since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has been one of the most prosperous and inspiring areas of post-apartheid South Africa international affairs though built on the ironic legacy of the racialized apartheid state and the ideologies of the A N C (Le Pere & Garth, 2014). As understood by Alden & Le Pere (2009), South Africa's foreign policy agenda following the demise of apartheid in1994 has been premised on the belief that the well-matched of human strategic review for Southern Africa, rights, democracy and solidarity politics is a means to its own developmental needs. This agenda is reinforced by its policy of multilateralism and observance of international law and signatory to several international conventions is seen as strategic to its foreign policy objectives and tacitly, maintaining the idea that South Africa is presumably one of the *de- facto* leaders in Africa. Coming out of its morally objectionable socio-political and economic ideology, a post-apartheid South Africa would likely be in a very good position to challenge the rest of Africa in political, economic and military terms. South Africa, while trying to shape its approach towards international relations, has been engaged in debate on a number of foreign policy issues, ranging from human rights to economic diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Hence a proud tradition of robust foreign policy; thus compelling us to reflect on post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy with reference to the role of its military in peacekeeping across Africa.

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) of recent has been a significant role player and debatably, central feature of the former apartheid enclave foreign policy. This perhaps, can be attributed to an aggregate of its political needs to deal with the frequent occurrence of objectionable levels of conflict and instability at regional level, precisely from an international and regional peacekeeping perception. This, no doubt, has opened up new prospects for South Africa ever since making regional peace and security one of the bases for its foreign policy. SANDF is therefore considered a dynamic and exceptional contribution that complements South Africa's diplomatic efforts and enhances South Africa's impact within the broader international developments (Defence Review Committee, 2014). In contrast to the position of South Africa before 1994, where regional seclusion, unilateralism, militarization and the dominance of the military instrument, was the order of the day, the post-1994 South Africa has however, route itself for a position of international relevance where participation in regional co-operation, multilateralism, diplomatic dialogue, and peacekeeping has

been accentuated in its foreign policy. This informed South Africa's foreign policy commitment to development, integration, promotion of peace and security in Africa, heightening by South-South and North-South cooperation; while promoting its national interests by participating in various global institutions of governance. Following the end of the cold war in 1990s, Africa, argued Egwu, (2007), coincidentally, has witnessed an increase in the frequency of internal conflicts. This occurs between different socio-ethnic and cultural groups within a national territory, and between groups who feel politically and economically excluded and marginalized from existing power structures on one hand, and on the other hand from central authority.

Across the borders of the continent are numerous and unhealthy security challenges spawned within individual societies. At the moment, security threats comprise challenges to human security and a whole range of socio-economic and environmental degradation along with traditional military security challenges (Dokubo & Joseph, 2011). Within the government in South Africa and towards the end of 1990s, there has been increasing appreciation of the fact that South Africa's socio-political and economic stability would be closely linked to the economic and political development of the Africa as a whole, a realization that reflected the close connection between regional stability and its national interest (Nibishaka, 2011). It is against this background that the work examines South Africa's military and its peacekeeping efforts in Africa; as a new paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy. Basically, the contention is that contrary to initial use of the South Africa military as an instrument of suppression within and outside South Africa, in more idealistic terms the South Africa military has gradually re-emerged to become a more prominent feature of South African foreign policy.

2. Methodology

Usually, there are some underlying theoretical and rational assumptions that establish useable research and which of the methods is appropriate for productive knowledge development in a particular study. This study, however, relied on interpretive approach in order to establish some assumptions, apart from given the work greater scope to discourse questions around the trajectories of South Africa's peacekeeping efforts in Africa. This method adopts the position that our knowledge of reality in peacekeeping efforts at international level is considered a new paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy since its transition from apartheid to democratic governance in 1994. Basically, the assumption is that states interact with the wider world through different diplomatic means with the goal to possibly protect and project its national interest in the totality of the targeted social, political and economic goals. Therefore, the reason for which this study has adopted interpretative method is to enable an in-depth study and understanding of the South Africa's peacekeeping efforts and its foreign policy objectives.

3. Theoretical expectation

Researchers in International Relations (IR) have identified a variety of actors that somewhat determines the direction of state's foreign policy; this include political experts, the epistemic communities (Jacobs & Page, n. d), the military who sometimes determines the international behaviour of states. Thus assuming that state's national interests vis-à-vis its behaviour at international level while using its military are clear and the means by which these interests are pursued are correspondingly clear. What this translates to mean is that the military (SANDF) is an additional stratum of actors who indirectly plays an important role in executing the foreign policy of a state, though not as key players in the policy-making process (Flynn, 2014). In IR, much academic work has been committed to other various forms of the uses of the armed forces but not much has been committed to the tangible activities of military contingents raised for peacekeeping purposes. This might be because peacekeeping, according to Bidwell (1978) is surreptitiously designed to be part of a face-saving tactic intended to provide a cover up for an unending war by proxy to prevent conflict that may jeopardize the national interest of the state providing the peacekeepers.

Theoretically, the topic peacekeeping to some extent is not a highly hypothesized subject. Most writings on the subject according to Fetherston (2000) have been done by diplomats and those in the military with experience in the field of peacekeeping; consequently, limiting the accumulation of knowledge on peacekeeping to a cautious list of do's and don'ts. Theorizing peacekeeping is therefore, an emerging field of

international relations. There has been a proliferation of terms such as first generation peacekeeping, peace-making or multidimensional peacekeeping in the past decades where the degrees of intervention and mandates of peace operations is variously described argued Fetherston (2000). The UN Charter; chapter 6, article 3 (1)   made provision for the pacific settlement of disputes, through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and/or judicial decision, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. However when pacific settlement fails, the goal of collective security (where the security of each member is assumed by all) motivates the provisions in Chapter 7 for coercive measures, including economic and military sanctions, against an aggressor (http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b3930.pdf). In practice, however, peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy has replaced collective security.

Earlier studies on peacekeeping mechanisms according to Pugh (2004:42) shows that peacekeeping developed in the 19th century Europe in the inter-war period as a means of dealing with emerging conflicts from struggles for self-determination against European imperial rule. The event that mark the beginning of the institutionalization of peacekeeping as an extension of UN diplomacy came into existence when the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was set up in 1956 to oversee the extraction of British, French and Israeli troops who had invaded Egypt (a former British colony), after nationalization of the Suez Canal. Peacekeeping one would therefore say is a strategic intervention for managing and resolving conflicts in the global community. There has been a plethora of definitions of peacekeeping by scholars. To Johnstone & Nkiwane (1993) peacekeeping is conceived as the deployment of the men of the armed forces (the military) and occasionally civilians under the control and command of the international body, generally after cease-fire has been accomplished, this however must be with the consent of the warring parties. Pugh (2004:47) in agreement describes peacekeeping as a multinational force, sometimes with a civilian component, whose mandate is to administer, monitor or patrol areas of conflict in a neutral and impartial way subject to the approval of the parties involved in the dispute. Using Burton's human needs approach and Fisher & Keashly's ideas of contingency and complementarily, Fetherston (2000) corroborates that peacekeeping activity is based on consent and a type of conflict resolution capable of productive positive results.

Expounding on these definitions, Liebenberg, Malan, Cilliers, Sass & Heinecken (1997),   states that the idea of peacekeeping has since been stretched and transformed to encompass a host of third-party interventions/strategy and actions; ranging from precautionary diplomacy to humanitarian support and the military execution of specific mandates or agreements brokered by the countries involved in peacekeeping to facilitate the development of positive peace where its success and effectiveness have positive meaning. Hence, Green, Kahl & Diehl (1998) perception has it that peacekeeping operations may possibly, be deployed at various stages of conflict; this may be before the occurrence of any violence or during a full-scale war. Set within this framework as an intervention/preventive deployment. The reason why NATO describes peacekeeping as a peace support operation resulting from an agreement or cessation of hostilities that has recognised an accommodating and peaceful environment where the level of consent and compliance is high and the risk of disruption is low(Ministry of Defence, 2011). The responsibilities of peacekeeping forces therefore, may be divided into two major areas, to act as a means of separation, a breathing space where both sides can step back from hostility to create conditions for peace by negotiations, and crucially, functions as peace building or supervise the implementation of an interim or final settlement negotiated by the peacemakers. Importantly, the peacekeepers are neutral and impartial towards the disputants; thus enhancing improved communication, social, political and economic regeneration. To accomplish this, two categories of forces are deployed to conflict areas; the observer missions predominantly of lightly armed officers and peace forces, made up of light infantry with the basic logistical supports (Neethling, 2000; Fetherston, 2000; Allan, 1991).

Nonetheless, peacekeeping as couched by Bidwell (1978:635), is an ambitious description in that the presence of peacekeepers has never kept the peace, owing to the fact that they have neither the authority nor the military capability to do it rather they function as a restorative agent whose mandate is to ensure positive peace. Positive peace has been described as a process or sets of structures which facilitate constructive resolution of conflict and positive human development (Neack, 1997). Peacekeepers therefore, serves as pacific, disinterested, and impartial agents which, at the moment when the belligerents feel so disposed, can separate the two sides, delineate truce lines, arrange the exchange of prisoners of war and report infractions of the truce agreement. By interpretation, the peacekeeping forces can only put forth a palliative influence,

appealing to the psychological moment when both sides are psychologically and physically worn out and with no choice of ignoring a call to cessation of hostility. This only mark the beginning of a long peace agreement that seldom guarantee a cessation to all violence, but only marks a point in time where some or all of the warring parties make a commitment to pursue a peaceful course to resolve conflict (Ministry of Defence, 2011:3). This, however, has not taking away the fact that peacekeeping is a prominent military intervention strategy for controlling, managing and resolving conflicts while providing humanitarian, economic and political support (restoring legitimate government), promotion of good communication, negotiation, mediation otherwise known as consent-promoting techniques which constitute the soft skills and processes of peacekeeping as opposed to the hard, or technical and military skills designed to win hearts and minds (Woodhouse, 2015:28).

Conflicts in Africa; a leeway to South Africa's peacekeeping efforts: In the last two decades, prolonged internecine wars particularly, in Africa, have been a common occurrence. Fundamental to South Africa's foreign policy objective since the collapse of apartheid is the promotion of peace in the continent. Although South Africa's successful transition to inclusive governance in 1994 was laden with joy for the continent. However, this joy has been marred by disastrous internal conflicts in other part of the continent. Internal conflicts in Africa are manifested in violent armed insurgence between governments and opposition or militia groups (ACCORD, 2007). It is within this context that South Africa's peacekeeping role in Africa emerged. At independence most countries in Africa inherited lopsided geographical areas where ethnic groups who were meant to be together found themselves in an unconducive geopolitical environment, with different socio-cultural background and language. By implication the foundation for political conflict in Africa was laid during the colonial era. Prior to independence, one factor that has bedevilled peace in Africa was the accentuation of differences between identity groups by the colonial government (Nibishaka, 2011), where some groups were recognized as being superior to others, hence, the categorization of people as inferior and superior. For example, in the case of Burundi, the minorities were considered as superior and therefore used by the colonial masters as instrument of suppression to control and overpower the majority.

This categorization has since been entrenched in the social formations of many African states thus leading to the recalibration of new form of identity accounting for the lingering nature of conflicts in Africa today. The politicisation of the Northern Cote d'Ivoire identity in the late 1990s, for example, apart from economic problem and the subsequent creation of the notion of "Ivoirité", that eventually led to the political crisis in the French speaking country is a reconceptualization of Ivoirian nationality by politicians struggling for political power (Nibishaka, 2011). Also factored into political instability in Africa is the challenge of inequality among groups and in all probability the prime cause of conflict in Africa. In essence, inequality between groups escalates the possibility of conflict. Correspondingly, socio-political and economic inequalities underpin the existentiality of conflicts in Africa. Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Liberia are examples of states where the monopoly of political power and its attendant benefits by one group had led to conflicts. What this means is that inequality breads conflict where there is division of society into two pre-dominant groups. Other factors include collapse of state institutions characterised by prolong destructive and greedy government operating through coercion, corruption and political personalism to secure political power and control of resources, the result of which is economic decline which plays a major role in state collapse and conflict, of which many occurs where political problems are traditionally resolved by means of violence. History have it that such countries like Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi created a state model based on the artificial construction and manipulation of ethnicity to maintain political power Department for International Development (2001).

In addition, there is conflict over control of resources. In Africa, for example, conflicts often occur where groups compete for access or control of resources. As understood by Le Billon (2000), there are two types of resource based conflict; wars of resource scarcity and wars of abundance; common among them is conflicts of insufficiency relating to the control of natural resources. Conflicts of abundance are very high where the state depends on natural resources such as oil; here the wealth of the country becomes the prize for controlling the state. Evidenced are the DRC, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, where the control of oil and diamond are seen as an instrument of control, therefore making the situation difficult to conciliation. It is no longer gainsaying that South Africa is an ambitions state and always willing to play a leading role in Africa. This ambitious position is reinforced by its economic power recognized internationally within and outside the continent. To a large

extent, this has contributed to an unprecedented restructuring of the regional economic and political architecture. Engaging techniques such as institutional building and moral suasion, according to Alden & Le Pere (2009), South Africa has promoted new regional structures and processes and, simultaneously, a revivalist form of the pan-Africanist ideology. It is this frame of pan-Africanist that characterised South Africa's entry into peacekeeping in Africa.

4. South Africa's military and peace keeping efforts

Ever since the admission of South Africa back into the Community of Democratic States following the demise of apartheid system and the espousal of inclusive governance, expectations in Africa have grown steadily vis-à-vis South Africa's prospective role as a peacekeeper in African conflicts. Observably, South Africa by all standards and going by its position in Southern African Development Community (SADC) and by extension global level, the former apartheid enclave should be able to ensure effective peacekeeping in Africa. The reason for this perhaps is as a result of the role (political-military) the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF) had played so far in the security requirements of Southern Africa. According to Neethling (2000) from an international perspective, there is a clear signal being sent to African countries that South Africa may likely be the country to shoulder the growing responsibility of conducting peace missions in Africa. This was demonstrated in May 2017 when President Jacob Zuma announced that South Africa's peacekeeping force in the DRC has been extended for a year Eye Witness News (May 5, 2017). Neethling (2000) contends that conventionally, the methods of contributing troops by states have not receive support from other countries on the continent as a result of the attendant financial and military responsibilities associated with peace missions in Africa. As a result of this, there is high expectation that South Africa will play a significant role in African peacekeeping requirements; influenced by efforts at international level to build home-grown peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Relatively, South Africa falls within the paw view of few countries that has the economic clout to flex its muscle whenever there is unhealthy political and economic infringement into her sphere of influence; hence, its ability to commit human and material resources to peacekeeping in Africa.

Comparatively, South Africa is no longer new in international peacekeeping efforts; the first of which was in 1998 when Pretoria deployed a set of personnel (SANDF) to Lesotho, though it was claimed to be a SADC intervention in the land lock country. South Africa under the UN had her first deployment to DRC in 1999, followed by its contribution in 2004 when South African troops formed the basis of the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Basically, South Africa's peacekeeping role has been impactful for sub-Saharan Africa; owing to the fact that South Africa in relativity is a military heavyweight with the capability of providing distant peacekeeping efforts, thus conceiving that SANDF is a force for stability in Africa. The emergence of South Africa as a major contributor to peacekeeping operations in Africa was informed by three major socio-political and economic developments. South Africa's political engagement on the continent (Africa) has been factored into its peacekeeping efforts; evidence is its efforts at conflict prevention and management by promoting dialogue and mediation. For example, the presence of SANDF in Burundi and the DRC were informed by South Africa's leading role as the architect of peace processes in the two countries. South Africa's presence in Darfur also serves as a pedestal to playing a leading role in the resolution of conflicts in the war torn country. The second development was the deployment of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in UN-led operations, at regional level (Burundi, 2003) and sub-regional organizations (Lesotho, 1998), as well as bilateral arrangements. For example, South Africa has at times deployed its personnel through bilateral agreements as in the DRC (2000) and Central African Republic (2003). In 2004, the former apartheid enclave and the DRC entered into a bilateral treaty on defence cooperation; this however, paved the way for the two countries to further sign bilateral agreement on military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Nibishaka, 2011).

Historically, South Africa has aligned its peacekeeping deployments with political and diplomatic mediation efforts in support of its growing image and role as a "middle power" in the international sphere (Lotze, de Coning & Neethling, 2015; Rettig, 2016). In 2000, during the DRC peacekeeping mission, the SANDF spearheaded efforts at stabilising the country's internal politics, reconstruction and development of infrastructure and also offered to train DRC's military personnel. South Africa therefore, sees peacekeeping operations as a sustainable foreign policy tool to back up its ambition of playing a leading role in multilateral forums apart from other benefits. Within the South Africa's government circle in the late 1990s, there was a

growing recognition of the fact that South Africa's socio-political and economic stability would be closely linked to the socio-economic and political prosperity of the continent (Africa) as a whole. Hence the close interconnection between continent's stability and South Africa's national interest. As an emerging continental power, South Africa for more than a decade has been a major contributor to international peacekeeping and has troops and military observers deployed in several African countries, these countries include the DRC, Burundi, and Darfur in Sudan. From the Defence Review of 2015 (Department of Defence, 2015) this is concomitant to South Africa's strategic stance and its inescapable continental leadership role; thus, enhances its influence within wider international developments, while promoting regional security, precisely through the application of its military capabilities to pressing African security issues. In its quest to maintain its ambitious continental power cum national interest, South Africa has participated in the following peacekeeping operations.

That South Africa has located its interests in Africa was demonstrated at the height of the devastated political crisis in the DRC; South Africa was the first African country to deploy in the war torn country in 1999; with additional deployment of troops under the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in 2001. Involved in this operation were the SANDF's Medical team, military police, the Engineering Corps, a Well Drill and ferry units then known as Operation Mistral, in 2006, later transformed to include; the Aviation Unit of the SANDF while the Well Drill and Ferry units were withdrawn. This phase of Operation Mistral contributed to taking the DRC to its first democratic elections in 2006, run mainly by MONUC (Department of Defence, Online). At the request of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, South Africa in 2000 deployed officers in support of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). In 1999, the OAU now African Union (AU) had brokered a peace deal that eventually ended an armed conflict between the two countries. In what was tagged as Operation Expresso Ethiopia and Eritrea, SANDF took over the operational control of all military persons deployed under OLMEE (Organisation of African Unity Liaison Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia); SANDF was kept on ground for UNMEE and OLMEE missions until 2008 owing to several extension requests. South Africa however pulled out of the mission for the reason that there were continued disputes over the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia in addition to a number of constraints from the Eritrean government, the result of which was the inability of UNMEE to accomplish its mandate (Department of Defence, Online).

From the Department of Defence (Online),the SANDF under the codenamed "Operation Cordite in Sudan" began in 2004 (July) in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) operating largely in the country's western region of Darfur. AMIS was later transformed into UN African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a hybrid African Union/United Nations mission in 2008. It is on record that South Africa was aboard and responded to a request to increase its commitment to a standard UN infantry battalion when AMIS was terminated. This was in form of various full-time force and Reserve Force units and regiments. In 2010 Operation Cordite committed more military personnel to expedite confidence building in the Sudanese military. Operation Cordite also contributed to the success of the referendum on Sudan's future, the result of which was the peaceful splitting up of the country into Sudan & South Sudan in 2011. Though, the SANDF commitment to peacekeeping in Sudan is officially over with gradual withdrawal of its 8 Infantry Battalion in the country in April 2016, after making its marks in ensuring peace in the country; and while South African soldiers will no longer be part of the hybrid AU/UN mission in Sudan, there will still be South African representation in the country. The need to re-establish peace where opposition leaders are allowed to participate in a transitional government stimulated South Africa to embark on an ambitious and dangerous peacekeeping mission in Burundi. An operation that was coded "Operation Curriculum" (Department of Defence, Online). To give it international recognition and legitimacy the operation was sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Initially, it was an AU mission but metamorphosed into a UN mission in 2004 with focus on peacekeeping, while the protection unit was excluded; a responsibility that was taken over by SANDF. In addition, to the SANDF mandates, the government (an interim government) of Burundi requested that the SANDF train the members of the Burundi Defence Force (BDF)in order to prepare them for the task of overseeing the protection unit upon the expiration of SANDF mandate.

After Burundi's successful and internationally recognised election, the operation came to an end after a successful withdrawal of the last SANDF troops in 2009 leaving Burundi peaceful and politically on its feet after ending the 15 years of civil war in the East African country. South Africa's role in sending peacekeepers

to Burundi was complemented by diplomatic efforts to shepherd the country toward peace. Burundi, however, slipped back into crisis in 2015; ironically, South Africa has at no point attempted any military reengagement in the country. Debatably, South Africa seems to have discounted the prospects of influencing its characteristic role as a hegemon in sub-Saharan Africa as well as a decisive leader and norm-builder in continental security (Rettig, 2016). One factor perhaps that has contributed to this might be as a result of domestic challenges, such as unemployment and changes in the GDP. The need to strengthen and harmonise regional and by extension international and national security informed South Africa's launch of "Operation Copper'' (Maritime security on the Mozambican channel) in January 2011. The need for effective maritime security in Southern Africa's as well as the increase spate of the activities of piracy in Somalia, the Seychelles and Kenya and its gradual movement towards Southern Africa serves as a pedestal to SANDF deploying several naval and air assets to Mozambican waters; with logistic support from the Mozambican Navy. The South Africa's frigates have since maintained a permanent presence in the northern Mozambique Channel most importantly to protect (South Africa's) merchant-marine ships (Defence Web, 2017). One of the features of South Africa intervention in Africa's political crises is helping to strengthen the recipient's military, on this notes the navies from neighbouring countries, such as the Mozambican Navy, receives training from the South Africa's Navy. This is in accordance with the maritime strategy for securing waters, drafted by South Africa, which has been adopted by SADC. Though very costly and expensive, the presence of SANDF (Operation Copper) is still very much felt in the Mozambican waters and as far as Tanzania coasts. At this point it is pertinent to ask the question; what motivate South Africa to engage in so much peacekeeping?

Underlying forces driving South Africa's contributions to peacekeeping: Typical of foreign policy is the relations of states which include navigating a complex array of diplomatic issues and actors and the elements that constitutes the basis for assessing the successes and challenges of states foreign policy. Though, South Africa is disposed to negotiation while settling disputes through dialogue and mediation with conflicting parties; nonetheless the SANDF has featured prominently as a diplomatic tool of South Africa's foreign policy particularly towards Africa which is why one might be tempted to dig into the underlying principle behind South Africa (SANDF) participation in peacekeeping operations across Africa.

The successful transition to democratic governance of South Africa no doubt had raised hopes for better and quality peacekeeping in Africa. South Africa's regional hegemony was no longer reserved for Cold War strategy and preserving Apartheid therefore, could in theory be applied to more affordable approaches to peacekeeping in Africa (Ditsong, 2013). South Africa's transition to democratic governance and accompanying commendation from the international community rejuvenated the hope for a future where Africa would have its own effective peacekeeping force. Debatably, South Africa seizes the opportunity to actualise its foreign policy objectives while trying to ensure peace on the continent. Fundamentally, there are three basic factors that reinforce South Africa's participation in peacekeeping; which are politics, economy and security, by extension these three elements translate to development.

At the time when the UN was struggling to achieve its goals in Africa, and attempts to forge cooperation between African states in continental peacekeeping were advancing slowly, South Africa was able to overcome its own immediate challenges through a successful transition to democratic governance. Elsewhere in Africa the end of the Cold War introduced the more classical paradigm of a massive shift in power. Military conflicts began to overwhelm the UN peacekeeping forces; and the OAU was in no position to take over the challenge. Between 1990 and 1994, the cost of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa increased six-fold (Neethling, 2008). South Africa's transition and accompanying international acclaim however revived the hope for a future where Africa would have its own effective peacekeeping force. There have been divergent of opinions and contributions by scholars on whether South Africa employs peacekeeping to its socio-economic

benefit. Suffice to say that on one hand one might argue that such does not exist. On the other hand one might conclude that South Africa has the covert intention of SANDF in peacekeeping to serving its economic interests in states wherein it stands the opportunity to contribute peacekeepers.

Political: Fundamentally, states made and affect its foreign policy within the international and domestic political context, which by interpretation means that a state may have multiple foreign policy goals – social, political, economy, military. Once formulated, it can be executed by various means with the aim of achieving targeted goals. It is within this context that the SANDF debatably accepts its position within the ambits of South African foreign policy; thus justifying its goal of promoting peace and stability on the continent as a key component of its foreign policy. In foreign policy, there is some purposeful behaviour exhibited when the state actors respond to the International environment and uses the best information available to maximize the goals of such state with the assumption that the state is a rational actor with established socio-political and economic goals. Debatably, one of the main motivations driving South African peacekeeping operation is political. To Lotze et al (2015), there are two political factors that underpin South Africa's drive for international, peacekeeping. On the basis that South Africa understands that its development (socio-political and economic prosperity) hinges on the progress and peace on the continent. South Africa has therefore, designed a foreign policy that promotes economic and social development in Africa, thus requiring the strengthening of peace and security within the continent. It is on this note that South Africa sees its contributions to regional, sub-regional, and by extension to UN peacekeeping missions as fundamental to its foreign policy objectives.

On the second note, South Africa in support of its growing image and role as a middle power internationally, has progressively come to use its "starring" role in Africa as a facilitator in peace processes. This role is strengthened through the deployment of SANDF in peacekeeping missions. This by extension has helped to influence South Africa's position in the committee of nations, most importantly the United Nations. This diplomatic action has paved the way for South Africa to punch above its weight (Lotze et al, 2015) and has therefore helped South Africa to further push for a permanent seat on a restructured UN Security Council. The fifth pillar of South Africa's national interests according to Nkoana-Mashabane (South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation), is based on the fact that South Africa is committed to working for a stable African continent where peace and development is engendered (Zondi et al, 2014). It is on this note that the above submission helps to unpack the rationale behind the concentration of South African peacekeeping operations on Africa, and perhaps the reason South Africa may not likely be committed to peacekeeping outside Africa. Hence the extension of deployment of the members the SANDF in the Democratic Republic of Congo by another year while fulfilling the international obligations of South Africa towards the UN (Eye Witness, 2017). The SANDF as reported by Eye Witness (2017)has over 1,371 members with the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Justifying the political role of South African National Defence Force, Heywood(1997)contends that militaries are political institutions of a very particular kind that can play different roles in the political life of a state; the most important of which is as an instrument of war. Foreign policy, once formulated, can be implemented by a number of means. Debatably, militaries are part of the inner caucus in a political system owing to the fact that they are represented in key policy-making bodies thus making them part of the institutional power base. It therefore means that militaries may well function as instruments of foreign policy (Du Plessis, 2003; Heywood, 1997). As an integral part of foreign policy implementation, the pacific use of the military in peacekeeping operations in this context refers to a diversity of ways in which military power can be applied.

Economy: In the words of South Africa's defence minister, NosiviweMapisa-Nqakula, while justifying the commitment of South Africa to maintaining peace in Africa; she said South Africa is committed to the renewal of the African continent and to the promotion of peace and stability which will lead to the sustainability of African development based on the understanding that South Africa's national interest is inextricably linked to what happens in Southern African sub-region, (SADC), and the continent of Africa in general (Allison, 2014). Landsberg (nd: 2) in his work titled "South Africa's African Agenda: Challenges of Policy and Implementation" states that one of the South Africa's foreign policy agenda for the African continent which is based on the understanding that Africa's socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and stability, is to contribute to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in Africa, particularly in

the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Although the main rationale that reinforces South Africa's engagement in peacekeeping is political, South Africa's deployments arguably serve to support its national economic interests. South Africa, according to Lotze et al. (2015) has deployed peacekeepers in countries where it holds commercial interests, such as the DRC and Sudan. Evidently, South African mobile telecommunications giants, Vodacom and MTN, mining companies, Standard Bank and state-owned electricity provider Eskom have invested heavily in the DRC apart from some South African farmers that are also growing crops in the country.

South Africa for example has developed a special relationship with Sudan, especially after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The two countries collaborate in various economic and commercial fields. It is on record that South Africa and Sudan have sixteen bilateral agreements that cut across a number of fields. They have growing cooperation in the energy sector, trade, agriculture, arts and culture, social development, scientific cooperation, as well as in security and military fields. South Africa established a diplomatic mission in Sudan immediately, following the signing of the CPA (SAnews, 2015). In other cases, bilateral deployments have been conducted where potential to extend South Africa's commercial interests exist, such as in the Central Africa Republic (CAR). In essence, the deployment of peacekeeping personnel cannot only be viewed as entirely distinct from South Africa's use of economic diplomacy as its influence spreads in Africa. Debatably, it should be viewed as grappling with balancing its national security interests and international investment competitiveness that comes from developed countries like China, USA, and Japan etc. It therefore means that South Africa's economic interest and importance are the driving forces behind its political stands on some of the crucial security and economic situations facing Africa today.

Security: South Africa dated from the period of apartheid has had a long history of (internal socio-economic and political)conflict and concerns over security, as well as long history of approaches to the management of security issues in this context (Cawthra, 2013). Traditionally, security is considered as the fundamental value and definitive goal of state behaviour (Evans & Newnham, 1996). Therefore, national security to every government is its most important responsibility; as it involves the protection and safety of the country and its citizens; against both internal and external threats that have the capability of challenging the security of the state, as well as the society, hence the involvement of South Africa in peacekeeping particularly in Africa. Built on the Draft Defence Review of 2014it is highlighted that, although South Africa is not well thought-out a global military force, it does have a significant military role to play in the Southern African region, commitments to international peace, in terms of peacekeeping and support operations in Africa. One can argue that South Africa's national security strategy, defence and foreign policy are viewed as intertwined. South Africa's domestic security is therefore viewed as intricately linked to that of regional security, and vice versa. The provision of security no doubt is the essence of every sovereign state. The history of government in human society is considered as the history of the steady expansion of the role of the state. This is (security) drove by and conceivably, driving changes to the notions of security for which the state is responsible. Therefore, the security of state is subject to the guarantees of security in all its dimensions. By interpretation, South Africa's security comprises economic policy driven by national interest with various international agreements.

Occasioned by its history, geography and economic prospects, South Africa arguably, is tactfully, pursuing a somewhat hegemonic regional policy, trying to use its relatively sophisticated military/economy as a tool which remains a basic reference in its regional diplomatic actions. In support of its growing image as a middle power; internationally, South Africa has progressively facilitates peace processes while protecting its national interest. This is reinforced through the deployment of SANDF in peacekeeping missions across Africa and SADC in particular. The Mozambique Channel is considered a vital maritime corridor for South Africa's economy, thus justifying the need for effective maritime security in Southern Africa's waters. While defending and protecting its national interest cum security, the SAND has deployed several naval and air assets to Mozambican waters. South Africa's frigates till date maintain a permanent presence in the northern Mozambique Channel, overtly because 80% of Southern Africa's imports and exports are transported by means of the sea.

5. Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that the evolution of peacekeeping operation and its merger with foreign policy has reflected and reinforced the structure of the world system. Peacekeeping, debatably is covertly designed to be part of a face-saving diplomatic tactic aimed at providing a cover up for an unending war by proxy to prevent conflict that may lead to deprivation of socio-political development and sometimes the political interest of the state providing the peacekeepers. South Africa's foreign policy goals since the adoption of inclusive democratic governance in 1994 has always been about contributing to a stronger African Union (AU), supporting efforts to build a more stable and peaceful continent. South Africa, till date, is one of the largest contributors in terms of finance to the AU's budget, the foundation of South Africa's foreign policy is therefore fundamentally held together by its moral capital, normative agency, and political importance. One of the South Africa's great soft power attributes has been the attraction and power of its transition to inclusive democratic governance after a long period of apartheid rule. This gave South Africa a certain moral authority and prestige to play very significant roles in conflict resolution and mediation through its peacekeeping operations across the continent (Africa). South Africa's quest for peace, which is mostly embedded in the African environment and its state system, has triggered the debate whether the disposition of South Africa's foreign policy is pivotal to promoting cooperation in Africa or diplomatically garnishing its ambitions of becoming hegemonic while aggressively pursuing its own political, security, economic and trade interests which by extension leads to inclusive development. This paper has therefore argued that though SANDF of recent has been a significant role player and a central feature of the former apartheid enclave foreign policy. However, it has open up new prospects for South Africa to develop its economy, its multilateral and foreign policy agendas which have very much been driven by the pursuit of its national interest while trying to ensure peace in other African states. Given the destructive and ruffian-like role South Africa played within SADC during the apartheid years, its post-1994 foreign policy has become sensitive to regional needs, and has since pursued an enviable foreign policy objectives based on the principles of equity and mutual benefit. South Africa's development diplomacy through peacekeeping underpin by the effective use of SANDF places emphasis on capacity building to deliver on human security needs in an efficient, democratic and sustainable manner.

South Africa has therefore focused its foreign policy responsiveness on providing institutional and capacity building support to some African countries emerging from violent conflict. These include Burundi, Sudan, the DRC where there have been heavy investment from South Africa's conglomerates as well as South African government own companies. Helping DRC to ensure peace and economic prosperity through investment from both individuals and government is a welcome development. This was the view of Mr Jean Madungu, a resident in Empangeni South Africa while commenting on the South African investment in the DRC. There are divergent opinions by scholars on whether South Africa employs peacekeeping to its benefit. Although some have held to the opinion that such does not exist, while others maintain that South Africa has the covert intention of SANDF in peacekeeping to serving its economic interests in states wherein it stands the opportunity to contribute peacekeepers. The post-apartheid South Africa since 1994, drawing on its experience of emerging from a seemingly intractable apartheid conflict situation has sought to position itself as a strong supporter of multilateralism, democracy and human rights within the committee of nations. Though South Africa's foreign policy in this regard seems to be inconsistent, and has often been criticized for these inconsistencies in its foreign policy approach. However, the belief within foreign policy circles is that the deployment of the members of SANDF in peace operations is fundamental to the country's inclusive foreign policy ambitions, a fit that has strengthened South Africa's international image as "African peacemaker".

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